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When originally conceived, this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems I was
designed to collect and organize data concerning the mechanisms-typically
called claims resolution facilities-developed to dispense funds to resolve
mass tort litigation. It was assumed worthwhile to establish a marketplace for
ideas concerning these facilities, to develop a cottage industry of expertise,
and to foster experimentation with various models. The leaders of virtually
all the major U.S. claims resolution facilities were invited to contribute
papers. The overall goal was to provide an anecdotal compendium of
information and thereby facilitate the generation of principles that might
inform future designers and implementers of procedures for disbursing
settlement funds. 2 The original conception was later broadened to include
commentary by academics and practitioners from a variety of perspectives:
administrative, economic, research, computerization, and psychological.
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II
THE ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITIES
From a broad perspective, the analysis of claims resolution facilities seems
to focus on six variables: (1) the advisability of instituting a claims resolution
facility at all; (2) the value system to be incorporated in the rules that govern
the claims resolution facility; (3) the relationship between design and
operation functions of a facility; (4) the management structure; (5) the
funding mechanism; and (6) the overall decisionmaking process.
From the beginning, one must consider the advisability of creating a
claims resolution facility, particularly in light of substantial start-up costs,
both in terms of administration and design. Most decisionmakers focus on
the allure of disbursement mechanisms-as alternatives to the existing tort
system-that reduce the high transaction costs associated with individualized
treatment. They also note the ethical problems under the current system that
involve potential conflicts of interest where allocation and disbursement
decisions are made by parties arguably having goals contrary to their clients'.
Particularly attractive to some is the creation of a Rawlsian veil that argues for
ex ante allocation decisions, thereby undercutting complaints of distribution
bias. Care should be devoted, however, not to create a vehicle that is so
efficient that it will almost guarantee overuse, simply because of its existence.
If the claims resolution facility becomes so routinized that undeserving
claimants view it as a public good, thereby making application for funds
costless to themselves while incurring costs for legitimate parties, the effect
may be counterproductive. These and many other concerns should be taken
into account in determining whether or not to establish a claims resolution
facility. Other factors that are typically considered include the types of claims,
the purposes to be served, the relative maturity of the litigation, the number
of claims, the available funding, and other idiosyncracies related to the
underlying litigation.
The most difficult series of decisions in the development of a facility
involve the selection of procedures from a menu of alternatives driven by a
variety of substantive value systems. For example, it must be determined
whether the facility should look more like the tort compensation system or
resemble a social security approach. Typically these procedures are chosen
after a review of values such as fairness and efficiency. The outcomes of these
choices determine certain boundaries such as who qualifies for compensation,
for what types of losses, and in what amounts. Other questions related to the
selection of procedures include: Who is the appropriate decider of value:
jury, judge, legislator, parties? What is an acceptable level of transaction
costs, most particularly attorneys' fees? To what extent should each claim be
scrutinized and individualized? What is the priority of claims? How are the
behavioral needs of claimants to be accommodated?
Most analyses of procedural worth find that the driving concerns of
fairness, efficiency, and other values often conflict both externally and
internally. Is it fairer to resolve cases "first-come, first-serve" or on the basis
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of need, particularly when determination of need may involve difficult or
arbitrary decisions? Is it fairer to have a jury, judge, legislature, or parties set
case values? In terms of efficiency, as a common sign notes, "Quality, time,
cost-pick any two." When are the error costs associated with paying false
positives sufficiently high to justify additional transaction costs? And when
should values of individualization and the requirement of a cause and effect
relationship-both of which inform the tort compensation system-succumb
to values of the group as a whole and to the needs of claimants regardless of
why or how they arose? When should the behavioral demands of litigant
satisfaction associated with full-fledged "due process" be rejected in the
interests of simplicity and ease of administration? In addition, when should
the claims resolution facility be used as a vehicle to alter fundamental tenets
of the existing compensation system? Should the facility, for example, be
inquisitorial and interventionist and reach out to bring in new claimants, to
assist them in marshalling their cases and to prevent others from profiting
from their ills? Or should the facility remain adversarial and rely upon the
claimants' responsiveness alone, without inquiry into errors or cost?
The designer of the claims resolution facility is typically not its
implementer, and the goals of the designer may be inconsistent with effective
or efficient implementation. One constant theme among the managers of
claims resolution facilities concerns the level of predictability or flexibility in
the source document. Interestingly there is no consensus among managers as
to whether there should be more guidance or more flexibility. Designers may
also have a similar dilemma because of new and conflicting values that may be
interjected by managers. In some instances, the designers and implementers
have been the same, and there have been institutionalized forms of continuing
advisory roles for the designers to insure that their input is represented. It is
not obvious what arrangement is superior. Yet it is clear that fundamental
flaws exist in some of the claims resolution facilities that were derived from
the designers' interests in reaching a settlement in the underlying case, a
desire that overwhelmed the ability of the facility to survive. The tendency to
ignore or defer problems to obtain an agreement among relevant parties may
doom that agreement unless there is a clear appreciation of the operation and
management of a claims resolution facility.
Oftentimes an ad hoc body with little or no previous experience in the
mass tort arena is chosen to manage a claims resolution facility. Such bodies
have been chosen because of their lack of knowledge, and arguable lack of
bias, concerning the underlying case that spawned the facility. One relatively
clear message provided by studying these cases is that behavioral concerns
unrelated to managerial efficiency that dominate the selection of trustees or
executives should be sublimated to concerns of competence and
professionalism. Once selected, these ad hoc bodies have succumbed to
arguable conflicts of interest in the selection of law firms, investment bankers,
facility personnel, and independent contractors. Even facility organizers who
would otherwise be deemed appropriate decisionmakers can become tainted
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by accusations of self-interest when dealing with control over such vast sums
of money. At times, the temptation to satisfy personal agenda may simply be
too great.
The selection of an established institution-such as was done in the Agent
Orange claims resolution plan-with long-standing controls to insure that no
personal benefits are derived from facility management seems to be a superior
approach. Indeed, the use of a trust format in the first instance may be
unsatisfactory.
The funding mechanism itself is probably the most important and most
neglected topic in this symposium. The most elegant and sophisticated
design will collapse without matching funding; indeed, these claims resolution
facilities arguably are maturing as compensation devices at a time when
funding sources are running on empty. In the presence of a close-ended
fund, an open-ended payment mechanism presents obvious dangers. This is
not to say that jury trials, and their unpredictable award amounts, must be
abandoned. In the UNR and Dalkon Shield claims resolution facilities,
plaintiffs have access to courts, but, in the event that there are less funds than
originally anticipated, jury verdicts are prorated exactly like settlements.
Finally, there is major concern over who decides these various issues
related to the design, implementation, and operation of claims resolution
facilities. We have instances where too much power in the hands of the court
or the parties can lead to severe dissatisfaction. In part this is because the
provider of funds-typically the defendant-cares about the amount but not
how the funds are dispersed, thereby eliminating one side of the adversarial
equation. This can lead to a potential conflict between the court and certain
beneficiaries, particularly when the court views itself as the protector of
unrepresented interests. A more satisfactory approach appears to be the use
of a court-appointed, true representative of those interests, so that the court
can maintain its more neutral role.
Another potentially corrupting influence for decisionmakers is the size of
the affected funds. The claims resolution facilities discussed in this
symposium involve more than $7 billion. A court may not, for example, be
the best institution to select among potential managers, some of whom view
their roles as satisfying their employer more than the fund's beneficiaries. At
the same time, courts may have agendas of their own that are not shared by
claimants, who are more often than not excluded from the decisionmaking
process. Thus, accountability remains an essential ingredient to any
successful claims resolution facility.
III
THE PAPERS IN THIS SYMPOSIUM
The papers in this symposium begin with the base case scenario presented
by Scott Baldwin of Marshall, Texas,3 who explains anecdotally how mass tort
3. Scott Baldwin, Comment, 53 L & Contemp Probs 9 (Autumn 1990).
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cases have traditionally been settled in the absence of claims resolution
facilities: the parties' attorneys determine a lump sum amount to resolve all
cases and then plaintiffs' counsel, using a variety of techniques, allocates the
monies among the various plaintiffs. From Scott Baldwin's perspective,
because this manner of settlement requires cooperation among the parties'
counsel and the court, the keys to such a settlement are the personalities of
those involved-parties, counsel, and judges-and their ability to work
together in harmony.
Outside the settlement facility context, some plaintiffs' counsel arrive at a
total settlement figure by evaluating each case individually and reaching an
additive value. Others set a flat value for a limited number of categories of
plaintiffs, place their clients into the categories, and multiply to determine a
total settlement amount. Still others decide what total amount of money they
can obtain for all of their cases and, once the total is determined, allocate the
money among their clients. Defense counsel typically do not second-guess
any of these allocation processes, and the courts intervene only when the
parties are minors or incompetents. In effect, therefore, both counsel act as
the claims resolution facility by reaching a settlement amount and allocating
and distributing it to the plaintiffs. This cooperative effort is an extremely
efficient process, if it works.
Where there are large number of parties, however, the personalities of
counsel can become overwhelmed by diversity and complexity. Transaction
costs skyrocket; inefficiencies in redundancy, communication, and opportunity
costs can be severe. The next contributor to the symposium, Larry Fitzpatrick
of the Asbestos Claims Facility and the Center for Claims Resolution,
4
discusses the mechanisms available to defendants for surmounting these
obstacles in the context of asbestos litigation. He discusses increasing the
number and lowering the value of case dispositions, reducing defense costs,
developing alternative settlement procedures, and producing superior trial
outcomes.
Marianna Smith of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust,5 next
discusses the claims resolution facility established for one defendant whose
assets were exceeded by claims-the Johns-Manville Corporation.
Traditional mass tort settlements, such as the Asbestos Claims Facility, the
Center for Claims Resolution, and the Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust, represent approaches designed to make the tort compensation system
more efficient while retaining the fundamental characteristics of tort
processes. Dean Robert McKay 6 discusses the Manville Property Damage
Claims Resolution Facility, which is at the other end of the compensation
system spectrum. There, because of an allocation of the bulk of the available
4. Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 L & Contemp Probs 13 (Autumn
1990).
5. Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 27 (Autumn 1990).
6. Robert B. McKay, Asbestos Property Damage Settlement in a Bankruptcy Setting, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 37 (Autumn 1990).
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funds to the personal injury trust, and a resultant shortfall in available cash,
the right to a jury trial was eliminated and a strict allocation formula was
devised by three arbitrators working under the auspices of the bankruptcy
court. The formula involved a no-fault, no-product-identification
reimbursement of specified expenses made by eligible plaintiffs on a
predetermined priority basis. In effect, the facility contemplated a totally new
type of compensation scheme based upon notions of fairness and reality
generally divorced from tort law.
The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program was modelled loosely after a
social security type of system. As explained by Harvey Berman of the Aetna
Life and Casualty Corporation, 7 the administrator of the program, there was
an underlying assumption in the case that there was no tort liability for the
plaintiffs and thus that the court, itself, could design a system that it felt was
fair. The resulting program pays veterans based upon total disability or
death, and offers a broad-ranging social services foundation.
My article on the DDT settlement fund,8 which was designed as a hybrid
with monies distributed under a system that attempted to mimic the tort
system in outcome but eliminate its attendant transaction costs, recounts how
the Agent Orange approach of unrestricted judicial design was rejected in
favor of a more traditional approach.
Kenneth Feinberg, one of the trustees of the Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust,9 next outlines the most complicated of the claims resolution facility
models. Under the trust's approach, the claimants were given a series of
payment options: flat amount, schedule of benefits, alternative dispute
resolution, or traditional litigation. The claimants themselves then decided
which model best satisfied their unique desires.
In a comparative article, Mark Peterson of the Institute for Civil Justice at
the RAND Corporation' 0 collected relevant data from each of the claims
resolution facilities and compared them along a compensation system axis.
He considers how the structure and operation of each facility related to its
relative success.
The last several authors in the symposium comment from various
perspectives on the development, implementation, and operation of claims
resolution facilities. Glen Robinson and Ken Abraham" propose the
aggregative valuation of mass tort claims. Ian Ayresl 2 evaluates the economic
7. Harvey P. Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 L & Contemp Probs 49
(Autumn 1990).
8. Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 L & Contemp Probs 61 (Autumn
1990).
9. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79 (Autumn
1990).
10. Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 L
& Contemp Probs 113 (Autumn 1990).
11. Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 137 (Autumn 1990).
12. Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 L & Contemp Probs 159 (Autumn
1990).
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incentives of resolving mass tort claims. Deborah Hensler I3 assesses the
current claims resolution facilities and outlines what we need to learn to
improve them. Tom Florence and Judith Gurney 14  discuss the
computerization of claims resolution facilities. Finally, Tom Tyler' 5 offers a
psychological perspective on the settlement on mass tort claims.
IV
CONCLUSION
Three recent developments illustrate some of the pitfalls associated with
the design and implementation of claims resolution facilities. On May 16,
1991, Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York concluded that the Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust should be reconstituted because the trust lacked sufficient
funds to pay its claimants. 16 He certified a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and approved a new series of
provisions for the operation of the trust, including a payment order based on
severity of disease rather than on order of filing and an annual pro rata
distribution of funds. Judge Weinstein also approved an elimination of all
incentives for jury trial and a reduction in attorneys' fees. The commonly
discussed seeds of the trust's destruction included unlimited access to trial,
pressure for settlement, design by only a portion of the beneficiaries, lack of
flexibility in implementation, and inexperienced management.
The second development involves the Dalkon Shield claims resolution
facility. A recent Wall Street Journal article on the facility was entitled "Large
Morass; Dalkon Shield Trust, Hailed as Innovative, Stirs a Lot of Discord;
IUD Claimants Call It Hostile to Challenges, Secretive in Making Its
Decisions; No Easy Cure for Mass Torts."i 7 This title reflects the sentiments
of at least some of the participants in the claims resolution process and
suggests a high level of dissatisfaction over claims processing. Commonly
discussed general complaints include a lack of willingness to compromise, a
failure to reveal information concerning the trust's evaluation of claims, an
insensitivity to the behavioral needs of claimants, and an overemphasis on
administrative convenience.
The third development is more general. The pervasive sense of
dissatisfaction with the existing procedures for handling mass torts has led to
an approach suggesting that the claims resolution facility model has a life of
its own as an end rather than as a means.is
13. Deborah R. Hensler, Assessing Claims Resolution Facilities: What We Need to Know, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 175 (Autumn 1990).
14. B. Thomas Florence &Judith Gurney, The Computerization of Mass Tort Settlement Facilities, 53 L
& Contemp Probs 189 (Autumn 1990).
15. Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 199 (Autumn 1990).
16. In rejohns Manville Corp., slip op 90-3873 (ED NY May 16, 1991).
17. Wall StreetJ 1 (June 3, 1991).
18. In reJohns Manville Corp., slip op 90-3973 at 61-63.
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Originally the claims resolution facility was merely a disbursement
mechanism totally dependent upon the tort system. Then it became a hybrid,
a method of engrafting more efficient, albeit less individualized,
administrative procedures onto the litigation process. Now there is evidence
that for some it has evolved into a substitute for the tort system, a vehicle to
promote new values in place of the values fostered by substantive tort law.
A number of commentators have indicated distaste for the transaction
costs, particularly plaintiff attorneys' fees, associated with tort cases; for the
drain of repeated asbestos cases on the courts; for the necessity of
individualized treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs; and for the
disbursement of compensation based upon the idiosyncracies of jury verdicts
and tort law rather than on the basis of need.' 9 An appropriately designed
claims resolution facility, such as was developed in Agent Orange, can, and at
least arguably should, rectify these perceived problems. There has been a
suggestion in at least one mass tort case,20 however, that a court has sought
out a case to use as a vehicle for reform, appointed counsel to achieve a
particular settlement, engaged in ex parte discussions to ensure that
settlement, and generally assumed the role of an advocate attempting to
legislate a particular claims resolution facility as an alternative to the existing
tort system.
2 '
Unfortunately the temperature of the debate raised by these three recent
developments has been sufficiently high that productive discourse has been
noticeably lacking. There has been a need for an academic view of claims
resolution facilities that have evolved from the exigencies of legal practice.
The purpose of this symposium is to provide a factual basis for common
understanding of claims resolution facilities and to raise the initial issues that
must be considered to develop a successful facility. The purpose of this
symposium is not to resolve these issues but to elevate the level of discourse
so that all participants-courts, plaintiffs, defendants, and others-can seek
superior solutions to their common problems. It is quite tempting for judges
and lawyers to assume that they have the expertise to design and implement a
claims resolution facility. The recent developments in Manville, Dalkon
Shield, and Eagle-Picher illustrate the difficulty of the task and the need for a
more sophisticated and interdisciplinary analysis.
Both academic and personal appreciation is due to Theresa Glover and the
student editors of Law and Contemporary Problems for making this issue possible.
The non-traditional subject matter and approach of the issue required
abundant diligence, care, and creativity.
19. See generally David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 Ind LJ 561 (1987); Trends in Asbestos Litigation (Federal Judicial Ctr, 1987); Alvin B. Rubin,
Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 Ga L Rev 429 (1986); Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass
Toxic Torts (RAND, Inst Civil Justice, 1985).
20. White v Eagle-Picher Industries, CV-90-4253 (E & SD NY December 11, 1990).
21. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, In re Patton, CV-90-3974 (2d Cir, filed
December 17, 1990), voluntarily dismissed, March 7, 1991.
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